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Entry Games: An Analysis of the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry
Kensuke Kubo†
January 25, 2010
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration.
The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying
firms’ payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on
rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the
vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates
indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects.
On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration.
I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The
simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry
into smaller markets.
Introduction
The effect of vertical integration on market outcomes—such as prices, quantities, and product
quality in the final goods market—can be either positive or negative. For instance, an increase in
the level of vertical integration can lead to higher prices or lower prices in the downstream market,
depending on the underlying demand and cost function parameters (Salinger [1988]; Hendricks
and McAfee [forthcoming]). This is because vertical integration has two countervailing effects:
one is to decrease the integrating firm’s costs through the elimination of double marginalization,
and the other is to raise the intermediate input costs faced by other non-integrated firms.
In addition, vertical integration is sometimes used to facilitate noncontractible investments in
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one of the segments of a vertical chain (Grossman and Hart [1986]), or to assure the supply
of an intermediate good (Carlton [1979]; Bolton and Whinston [1993]). Integration based on
these motives will also affect market outcomes, but the direction of such effects is generally
indeterminate. Because of these inherent indeterminacies, the motives for, and the effects of
vertical integration tend to be analyzed on an industry-by-industry basis. The results of such
studies are then used to inform competition policy as well as corporate strategy (Lafontaine and
Slade [2007]).
This paper presents a novel method for empirically examining vertical integration in an
individual industry. The basic idea is to apply an econometric model of a static entry game to
a vertical setting. By estimating firms’ payoff functions in a vertical entry game, it is possible
to recover vertical rival effects—the effect of upstream, downstream, and vertically integrated
rival entry on profits. These estimates can then be used to make inferences about the effect of
increased vertical integration on market outcomes. While the focus is on estimating the effects
of vertical integration, the econometric model is also capable of shedding light on the motives
for vertical integration.1
To motivate the empirical analysis, I present a game theoretic model of simultaneous entry
into an oligopolistic market consisting of an upstream segment that supplies an intermediate
good and a downstream segment that uses the intermediate good to produce a final good. The
players of the game are potential entrants who can enter into one of the vertical segments or
both. After entry decisions have been made, vertically oligopolistic competition occurs within
the post-entry market structure. Firms’ entry decisions are based on their expectations of post-
entry profits, which in turn are affected by the expected entry decisions of other firms. Put
another way, potential entrants form profit expectations according to the market structure they
expect in the entry equilibrium, as well as the position they foresee for themselves within that
market structure. In my model, potential entrants are heterogeneous in both observable and
unobservable ways, and the entry game is one of complete information.
My data consist of observations on vertical entry patterns in multiple markets. I interpret
the entry patterns as the outcomes of a vertical entry game. By assuming a structural model
such as the one described in the previous paragraph, I can use the entry pattern data to infer how
vertical integration by one set of firms affects the profits of others. In other words, I can estimate
vertical rival effects. The dataset comes from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. It covers
multiple markets, each consisting of a distinct pharmaceutical product. The upstream segment of
1Inferring the motives for vertical integration from entry games is the topic of a companion paper that is in
progress.
2
each market supplies the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), and the downstream segment
processes APIs into finished formulations such as tablets and capsules. The clear demarcation
between the upstream and downstream segments, as well as the existence of both vertically
integrated and non-integrated firms make the generics industry an attractive setting for my
analysis.
The object of estimation is the set of firm-level post-entry payoff equations corresponding
to three different categories of entry: downstream-only, upstream-only, and vertically integrated.
A given potential entrant chooses the entry category, or action, that yields the highest profit
net of entry costs. Each payoff equation contains as arguments the variables that describe the
actions of other potential entrants. The coefficient estimates for these variables provide the main
results of the study. I find that vertical integration between a pair of firms has a significantly
negative effect on independent upstream rivals. I also find that the effect of vertical integration
on independent downstream rivals is positive. Taken together, these results suggest that vertical
integration has large efficiency effects (i.e., cost reductions for the integrating firm), and that
vertical integration does not reduce independent downstream firms’ access to the intermediate
good. I use the parameter estimates to simulate the effect of a policy that bans vertically
integrated entry. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that, for smaller markets, prohibiting vertically
integrated entry is likely to reduce the number of entrants in both the upstream and downstream
segments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section I, I explain how this study
fits into the industrial organization literature on vertical integration as well as to the literature
on market entry in the generic pharmaceutical industry. To my knowledge, the paper is novel on
two fronts: it is the first empirical paper to exploit an entry game structure in order to analyze
vertical integration; it is also the first econometric paper to investigate vertical integration
in the generics industry.2 In section II, I describe the vertical structure of the US generic
pharmaceutical industry, and discuss the possible motives for and effects of vertical integration.
In section III, I present the econometric specification along with the underlying model of a
vertical entry game. In section IV, I describe the estimation strategy, followed by a description
of the data in section V. Section VI presents the estimation results from the vertical oligopoly
entry model together with the results of policy simulation. A concluding section follows.
2Elberfeld [2002] is a theoretical analysis of vertical market structure formation in which firms play an entry
game before competing in vertical oligopoly.
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I Relationship to previous studies
I.1 Empirical analysis of vertical integration
Empirical research on vertical integration can be classified into those that investigate motivations
and those that look at effects. Studies in the former group, including Woodruff [2002], Baker and
Hubbard [2004], and Ciliberto [2006] address the question: why do firms vertically integrate?
A common approach is to identify the characteristics of products or industries whose producers
tend to be vertically integrated. Studies in the latter group ask the following: what happens
to market outcomes when firms vertically integrate? Most authors examine the direct impact
on market outcomes (price of the final good, product quality, etc.). A few try to infer vertical
integration’s impact on market outocomes by estimating its effect on competing firms’ profits.
This paper focuses on the effect of vertical integration on market outcomes. The parameter
estimates can also be used to investigate the motivations for integration, but this topic is left
for a companion paper. Like many other studies on the effects of vertical integration, my main
interest is in the phenomenon known as vertical foreclosure—an increase in the final good price
as a result of restricted access to an essential intermediate good. Before reviewing the empirical
literature, let us briefly consider the economic theory.
Vertical foreclosure theory
Do vertically integrated firms restrict supply of the intermediate good with an aim to raise the
final good price? If they do, what are the precise mechanics of their actions? These questions
have been at the heart of a decades-long debate among scholars and practitioners, both legal and
economic. Riordan’s [2008] review summarizes the notable theretical models that have shaped
this debate. The more recent studies are collectively known as the New Foreclosure Theory, and
they identify the conditions under which vertical integration can give rise to foreclosure effects.
The models are roughly divided into two groups: (i) models in which vertical integration is used
to raise downstream rivals’ costs (Salinger [1988]; Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [1990, 1992];
Riordan [1998]; Chen [2001]), and (ii) models where vertical integration allows upstream units
to restrict the supply of the intermediate good and restore monopoly power (Hart and Tirole
[1990]; Rey and Tirole [2007]).
The “raising rivals’ costs” theory is based on the idea that vertical integration between a
pair of firms dampens competition in the upstream intermediate good market. This may raise the
price that independent (i.e., non-integrated) downstream firms pay for the intermediate good. As
an illustration, consider the two-by-two market configuration presented in figure 1. In panel (i) all
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manufacturing units operate as independent firms, while in panel (ii) one pair of units is vertically
integrated. In the quintessential raising-rivals’-costs model of Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [1990]
(henceforth the “OSS model”) the upstream units produce a homogeneous good and compete in
prices, while the downstream units produce differentiated products and also compete in prices.
The homogeneous good assumption implies that the price of the intermediate good in panel (i)
is equated to its marginal cost of production. The question is how the intermediate good price
is determined in panel (ii). OSS argue that the integrated firm has the incentive, as well as the
ability, to raise the price substantially above marginal cost. This translates to a higher marginal
cost for the independent downstream firm and a higher final good price.
The OSS model has been subjected to some criticism. First, Hart and Tirole [1990] and
Reiffen [1992] raised doubts regarding the integrated firm’s ability to raise the intermediate good
price above marginal cost. Specifically, in a static game the integrated firm cannot commit not to
undercut the independent upstream firm’s price, and so the upstream price falls to the Bertrand
level. Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [1992] argued that high prices can be maintained if the two
upstream units compete in a descending-price auction to supply the independent downstream
unit. Riordan and Salop [1995] and Normann [2006] showed that the OSS conclusions are valid
if the firms engage in repeated play. As these examples show, OSS-type results do hold in some
models, but only if the basic setup is modified. Another critique of OSS is that the assumption
of linear pricing of the intermediate good is not realistic in many industries, and that foreclosure
effects would be much weaker under nonlinear pricing (Hart and Tirole [1990]). While both
critiques are quite valid, the OSS model continues to form a cornerstone of economic thought on
vertical foreclosure. This may be because, as noted by Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [1992], “The
notion that vertically integrated firms behave differently from unintegrated ones in supplying
inputs to downstream rivals would strike a businessperson, if not an economist, as common
sense” (p.698).
An alternative to raising rivals’ costs theory is the “monopoly restoration” theory of Rey
and Tirole [2007]. They showed how, in a one-by-two setting as in figure 2, downward integration
by the sole upstream firm can have a foreclosure effect even if the intermediate good is priced
nonlinearly. This is because vertical integration gives the upstream unit the ability to commit
to a lower total quantity of the intermediate good. In other words, under vertical separation—
panel (i) of figure 2—the upstream monopolist U supplies more of the intermediate good than
the profit maximal (i.e., monopolistic) amount. This is because U cannot convince either D1 or
D2 that it will restrict supply to the other firm. Under the two-by-two configuration of figure 1,
vertical integration has no foreclosure effects unless the marginal cost of the integrating upstream
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unit is substantially lower than that of the independent upstream unit (Hart and Tirole [1990]).
As this brief review suggests, the existence of vertical foreclosure is sensitive to model
assumptions. Particularly important are the assuptions regarding pricing behavior (linear or
nonlinear) and those regarding time horizon (one-shot or repeated pricing game). In addition,
research focusing on the bargaining between upstream and downstream units indicates that the
existence of foreclosure is sensitive to bargaining format (Hart and Tirole [1990]; de Fontenay and
Gans [2005]). In studying individual industries, it is crucial that some idea is formed regarding
the underlying theoretical model.
Empirics of vertical foreclosure
Most of the empirical analysis on vertical foreclosure looks directly at the effect of vertical
integration on market outcomes (e.g., Hastings and Gilbert [2006], Hortac¸su and Syverson [2007],
Ciliberto and Dranove [2006], and Suzuki [2008]). A general conclusion from this literature is
that the effect of vertical integration varies across industries; higher final good prices (or lower
product quality) due to vertical integration is found in some industries, but not in others. This
could be because there are little or no foreclosure effects in certain industries, possibly due
to commitment problems or nonlinear pricing. Alternatively, it could be that any foreclosure
effects that do exist are offset by the efficiency effects of vertical integration that work to lower
downstream prices. One such efficiency effect is the elimination of double margins that exist in
vertically related oligopolies under linear pricing. Another is the improvement in incentives for
productive noncontractible investment.
Martin, Normann, and Snyder [2001] and Normann [2007] are two important papers pro-
viding experimental evidence on foreclosure. Normann [2007] shows that, despite the criticism
received by OSS, raising-rivals’-costs strategies do appear in one-shot vertical oligopoly games
played in a laboratory setting by university students. Similarly, Martin, Normann, and Snyder
[2001] demonstrate that the monopoly restoration model is partially supported by experimental
data. Thus, the experimental literature provides support for vertical foreclosure theory, not
least because efficiency effects can be assumed away.
Rosengren and Meehan [1994] and Snyder [1995] look at the effect of vertical integration on
rival profits (i.e., rival effects) in order to say something about vertical foreclosure. Both papers
focus on the effect of a vertical merger announcement on the stock prices of nonintegrated
rivals. Rosengren and Meehan [1994] do not find that vertical mergers have a significant effect
on independent downstream rivals. Thus, they find no support for foreclosure theory. In a
study of the British beer industry described by Snyder [1995], it is found that an independent
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upstream brewery was harmed by vertical integration between rival breweries and downstream
pubs. Snyder [1995] interprets this as support of foreclosure theory.3
My study is closest in approach to the papers discussed in the previous paragraph in that I
estimate rival effects to make inferences about the effects of vertical integration. This approach
has two hurdles that must be overcome before meaningful tests can be constructed. The first is
the choice of underlying theoretical model. The raising-rivals’-costs and monopoly restoration
theories yield different predictions regarding the relationship between foreclosure effects and rival
profit effects. That is, they disagree on what kind of rival effects are likely to be observed when
foreclosure effects are present. As Snyder [1995] points out, vertical integration with foreclosure
has a positive impact on independent upstream profits in the OSS model, but the impact is
negative or neutral in Hart and Tirole [1990].
The second issue is the disentangling of foreclosure effects and efficiency effects. In many
cases, foreclosure effects and efficiency effects move the profits of unitegrated rival firms in the
same direction. This makes it difficult to identify the existence of foreclosure effects using only
rival effect estimates. For example, Rey and Tirole [2007] suggest testing foreclosure theory by
seeing if the profits of independent downstream firms fall in response to vertical integration by a
monopolistic upstream firm.4 Yet at the same time, they admit that the test is “subject to the
potential criticism that specific increases in the merged entity’s efficiency may hurt downstream
rivals even in the absence of foreclosure intent” (p.2166). Snyder [1995] suggests addressing such
concerns by using out-of-sample information. In the aforementioned beer study, he rules out
efficiency effects by citing a UK government finding that “retail prices were higher for integrated
pubs on average than for unintegrated pubs” (p.115). In general, however, it is difficult to find
valid supporting evidence to rule out efficiency effects. The two issues above are further discussed
in sections II and III.
I.2 Market entry in the generic pharmaceutical industry
In the pharmaceutical industry, new drugs are developed by originator—also called brand-name
or innovator—pharmaceutical companies. After a new drug loses patent protection, generic
pharmaceutical companies can enter the market, offering products that are equivalent to the
originator’s. The generics industry consists of a number of markets, each defined by a particular
3It should be noted that in the OSS model independent upstream rivals benefit from vertical integration when
foreclosure effects are present.
4The raising-rivals’-costs model predicts that independent downstream profits fall in response to vertical
integration. The monopoly restoration model makes no prediction regarding the direction of change, because all
downstream profits are extracted by the upstream firm through nonlinear tariffs and take-it-or-leave-it bargaining.
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product, that open up to competition at different points in time as originator patents expire.
It is one of the few industries where one can observe a large number of markets where near-
simultaneous entry by multiple firms takes place. This feature makes it an attractive setting for
studying entry and market structure formation. Previous studies look at the determinants of
market entry by individual firms (Scott Morton [1999]; Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008]) and
the possibility of entry deterrence by originator pharmaceutical companies (Ellison and Ellison
[2007]; Marco [2005]). Others investigate how market prices are influenced by market structure.
A universal finding is that the price of generics is significantly lower than that of brand-name
drugs (Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz [1991]). Some studies, such as Grabowski and Vernon
[1992] and Frank and Salkever [1997], find that the price of the brand-name drug sometimes
increase in response to generic entry. Meanwhile, all studies agree that the price of generic
drugs is decreasing in the number of generic entrants (e.g., Reiffen and Ward [2005]).
My study is closest in spirit to Scott Morton [1999] who focuses on entry in the downstream
finished formulations segment. The theoretical model underlying her econometric analysis has
the following feature: in the entry equilibrium for market m, all firms calculate the same “cutoff
entry cost” F ∗m such that only those firms having entry cost below it enter the market.5 F ∗m is
assumed to be a function of market characteristics and firm i’s position relative to the cuttoff level
is a function of its own characteristics.6 Thus, the object of estimation in Scott Morton [1999]—
the set of firms’ payoff equations—contains only market and firm characteristics as arguments;
the number of rival entrants does not enter the payoff equation. Because of this simplified
specification, Scott Morton’s [1999] analysis does not focus on rival effects. An important finding
of her study is that a firm’s experience level—measured as the number of similar markets entered
in the past, where similarity is defined as commonality in dosage form or therapeutic class—has
a significantly positive effect on its propensity to enter. This suggests the existence of learning
effects and/or economies of scope across similar products.
Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008], who also examine downstream entry decisions, extend
the econometric model of Scott Morton [1999] in two ways. First, they allow the number of
rival entrants to enter the payoff equation so that horizontal rival effects can be estimated.
Second, Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008] recognize that different generic drug markets open
up sequentially, so that the sequence of entry decisions by each firm should be thought of as the
solution to a dynamic optimization problem. In fact, because firm interactions are incorporated,
5Quint and Einav [2005] show that such an equilbrium results from an entry game where entry costs are
gradually sunk prior to the entry date.
6It may be more realistic to let F ∗m be a function not only of market characteristics, but also the characteristics
of all potential entrants.
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Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008] estimate a dynamic game. In their model firms are allowed to
be forward-looking; current entry decisions are made with the knowlege that future payoffs will
be affected. My study is similar to Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008] in that I estimate rival
effects. I make an additional contribution by considering entry in the upstream segment as well
as the downstream segment, allowing the possibility of vertically integrated entry. On the other
hand, I do not incorporate dynamics. As Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008] acknowledge, a
dynamic and game theoretic specification leads to “severe computational difficulty in estimating
the model” (p.2), which would be compounded by the consideration of vertical issues.
The estimation of a vertical entry model is a novel contribution to the empirical literature
on static entry games. This field has been motivated by the technical challenge of how to handle
the number of rival entrants—a key variable that is clearly endogenous. The earliest studies
were Bresnahan and Reiss [1991a,b] and Berry [1992]. In Berry’s [1992] analysis of entry in the
airline industry, each potential entrant’s post-entry profit is calculated from market and firm
characeteristics, candidate values for the number of other entrants, candidate parameter values,
and simulated draws corresponding to unobserved fixed entry costs. The predicted payoffs
are used to find the equilibrium market structure. The parameter point estimates are those
that minimize the difference between the predicted market structure and the observed market
structure.
Recently, Mazzeo [2002], Seim [2006], and Orhun [2005] extended this framework to markets
with product differentiation. In these studies, firms decide not only whether or not to enter a
market, but also how or where to enter. Mazzeo [2002] considers highway-exit motel markets
where operators decide among different quality levels. In Seim [2006] and Orhun [2005], stores
choose among different locations. In all cases, the parameters of interest are those describing the
effect that different types of rival entrants have on post-entry profits. My vertical entry model
can be thought of as a variant of the differentiated-product entry model, the results of which
yield insights into the effects of vertical integration.
II Vertical structure of the generic pharmaceutical industry
The US generic pharmaceutical industry is characterized by a clear demarcation between the
upstream and downstream segments. The upstream segment manufactures active pharmaceuti-
cal ingredients (APIs), using basic and intermediate chemicals, solvents, catalysts, etc. as raw
material. The downstream segment manufactures finished formulations by combining the API
with excipients and processing them into dose forms such as tablets, capsules, and injectables.
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The US generics market has traditionally been characterized by vertical separation of the
upstream and downstream segments. This is because when the industry began to grow in the
1980s, high quality and low cost active ingredients were available from Italy and other countries
that had weak patent laws at the time (Bryant [2004]). American generic drug companies such
as Mylan and Barr initially chose not to manufacture APIs in-house. However, firms began to
exhibit vertical integration during the 1990s. Foreign firms who traditionally only supplied APIs
increasingly entered the finished formulation market. Examples of such firms are Teva of Israel
and Ranbaxy of India. In recent years, the traditionally non-integrated US firms have also begun
to acquire upstream assets. Examples include the acquisition of Indian API manufacturers by
Watson and Mylan, both large US finished formulation companies.7 As of the late 2000s, most
of the large generic drug companies in the US market are vertically integrated to some extent.
However, firms differ in the extent of vertical integration. Mylan and Barr continue to be
predominantly downstream firms. On the other hand, Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, and
other Indian firms have a larger presence in the upstream segment, while continuing to expand
their downstream activities in the US.
Firms decide on their vertical integration status on a market-by-market basis. For example,
Teva uses its in-house API for some of their finished formulation products but not for others,
as seen in the first row of table 1. The upper panel of table 1 reveals the heteogeneity of firms’
vertical entry strategies: Mylan, prior to its acquisition of Matrix in late 2006, only entered as
an independent downstream producer. Meanwhile, the Indian API company Cipla only entered
the upstream segment. Both Teva and Ranbaxy are vertically integrated, but it can be seen
that Ranbaxy’s activities are relatively more concentrated in the upstream sector.
The lower panel of table 1 presents the number of entrants per market. The number of
independent upstream and independent downstream entrants both average around four, with
some markets attracting more than ten entrants in a single segment. The average number
of vertical entrants is only slightly below one, suggesting that vertically integrated entry is a
common occurence.
The motives for vertical integration have been reported in the industry press. A purchasing
executive at Sandoz, one of the largest firms, mentions lower API costs, earlier access to APIs,
and stability of supply as the advantages of vertical integration (Stafford [2006]). Others have
mentioned the possibility that vertical integration allows better control over the information flow
between segments, as well as better risk-sharing (Erdei [2004]; Hoffman [2004]). These point to
7Mylan acquired a majority stake in a large Indian API manufacturer called Matrix in September 2006. In
the same month, Watson acquired a smaller firm called Sekhsaria (Roumeliotis [2006]; Barnes [2006]).
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the existence of efficiency effects generated through vertical integration.
On the other hand, recent antitrust cases suggest that vertical integration can create an-
ticompetitive foreclosure effects. In Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan et al., the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) claimed that an exclusive dealing contract between Mylan and an
upstream firm regarding the APIs for lorazepam and clorazepate tablets contributed to price
increases of between 1,900 and 3,200 percent for the downstream products.8 The upstream firm,
Profarmaco, terminated its supply of APIs to Mylan’s competitors, Watson and Purpac. These
two downstream firms were forced to reduce their tablet production significantly. Mylan also
convinced another upstream firm, called FIS, to raise its price of lorazepam API. As a result, a
third downstream company called Geneva—a customer of FIS—raised the price of its tablets to
match Mylan’s level. This is a classic example of pure vertical foreclosure described by the OSS
model.9 An important aspect of this case is that the Mylan-Profarmaco combine was unable to
extract the profits of downstream competitors through nonlinear pricing. This strongly suggests
that in the generics industry, the raising-rivals’-costs theory of vertical foreclosure is more ap-
plicable than the monopoly restoration theory—a suggestion with implications for econometric
analysis.
Unlike exclusive dealing contracts, vertically integrated entry is not subject to antritrust
scrutiny. Moreover, the US government’s review of mergers within the generic pharmaceutical
industry focus only on horizontal effects in the downstream segment (Silber [2007]).10 There is,
however, no reason to assume that vertical integration cannot have the same anticompetitive
effects as exclusive dealing. If it does, then future merger reviews for the generic pharmaceutical
industry may have to include a vertical component.11 This study provides the first formal and
systematic analysis of the competitive effects of vertical integration in this industry.12
8See Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan et al., DC District Court, 1999 (http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/
02/mylanamencmp.htm).
9For another case of vertical foreclosure through exclusive dealing, see Geneva and Apothecon v. Barr et al.,
2d Cir., 2004 (http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020510u1.html).
10For an example, see Federal Trade Commission: In the matter of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and IVAX
Corporation, Docket No. C-4155. Analysis of agreement containing consent orders, filed January 20, 2006
(http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510214/0510214analysis.pdf).
11Villas-Boas [2007], Hendricks and McAfee [forthcoming], and Manuszak [2010] illustrate the importance of
incorporating vertical aspects into merger analysis.
12Unfortunately, exclusive dealing contracts are rarely observable and my econometric analysis does not take
them into account. There is some reason to think that exclusive dealing contracts may have become more
costly to implement after FTC v Mylan. As part of a settlement with the FTC, Mylan and its API suppliers
(Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma Laboratories) agreed, for a five-year period starting 2000, to notify the FTC
before entering into any exclusive dealing agreement with any other firm. Moreover, the firms were prohibited
from taking part in any exclusive dealing contract whose effect is to “unreasonably restrain trade” and “create an
unlawful monopoly”. See Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan et al., Order and Stipulated Permanent Injunction,
DC District Court, 2000 (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/11/mylanordandstip.htm).
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III Econometric Specification
The basic econometric framework follows that of Berry [1992]. Each firm in the dataset is
provided with a set of payoff equations corresponding to its possible actions. Given values for
the explanatory variables, parameters, and error terms, the predicted payoff values define each
firm’s best response given the actions of the other firms. For every market in the dataset, the
system of best responses is solved for to yield the Nash equilibrium of the vertical entry game.
The objective is to find the parameter values such that the predicted Nash equilibria of the entry
games are as close as possible to observed entry patterns.
III.1 Entry game specification
The object of estimation is the set of firm-level post-entry payoff equations corresponding to three
different categories of entry: independent downstream, independent upstream, and vertically
integrated:
pimik = h(xmi;ωk) + gk(Nmi; δk) + mik,
m ∈M ≡ {1, 2, ...,M} i ∈ Im k ∈ K ≡ {D,U, V }.
(1)
The subscripts m, i, and k denote market, firm, and entry category, respectively. M is the
number of markets in the data and Im is the set of potential entrant firms in market m. K, the
set of entry categories, is also the firm’s choice set. Its elements D, U , and V are shorthand for
“independent downstream”, “independent upstream”, and “vertically integrated”, respectively.
The payoff for no entry is normalized to zero. xmi is a row vector of market and firm charac-
teristics (including an intercept) and Nmi ≡
[
NDmi N
U
mi N
V
mi
]T is a three dimensional vector
representing the number of entrants (excluding firm i) in each entry category. The function h(·)
is common to all categories, but the gk(·) functions are specific to each category. gk(·) describes
the competitive effects of rival entrants for a firm in category k, and additive separability be-
tween xmi and Nmi is assumed. ωk and δk are parameter vectors to be estimated, and mik is a
random error term.
Given values for xmi, Nmi, mik and the parameters, potential entrant i can figure out its
optimal action. However, Nmi is not observed until the actions of firms j 6= i have been decided.
By the time i observes the actions of its rivals, though, it will be too late for i to choose its own
action.13 Here, game theory comes into play. We can assume that firms play an entry game,
13Recall that in the generics industry, market prices fall with the number of entrants. Given the delay between
entry decision and actual entry, due to the Food and Drug Administration’s drug approval process, generic drug
companies lose substantially by delaying entry.
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and that the entry equilibrium is Nash in discrete actions. Thus, firm i forms an expectation of
Nmi and accordingly calculates its post-entry payoffs to make its entry decision. In equilibrium,
it will turn out that the realized entry equilibrium is indeed Nm (unlike Nmi, Nm—lacking a
firm subscript—incorporates the actions of all firms including i). As Berry [1992] and others
demonstrate, the econometrician can also use the Nash equilibrium concept during estimation.
Specifically, different trial values for Nm are plugged in until the firms’ optimal actions predicted
by the fitted payoff values are consistent with the market structure defined by the trial value.
The equilibrium conditions for the entry game are as follows:
• An entrant choosing action k finds it profit maximal to choose k, given the actions of
others.
• A non-entering firm makes negative profits if it were to choose any other action k.
As I describe in section IV, an algorithm for equilibrium-finding can be incorporated into
the estimation routine. One potential problem is the possibility of multiple equilbria in the entry
game. There may be multiple trial values of Nm that satisfy the equilibrium conditions. This
is indeed the case in the vertical entry model, as I discuss in sections IV and VI.
III.2 Specification of rival effects
Estimates for gk(Nmi; δk), the functions containing the rival effects, form the key results. Hence,
their specification must be thought out carefully. Many previous studies specify gk(·) as being
linear in N. This has the benefit of being easier to estimate than nonlinear specifications when
the underlying entry game is one of incomplete information (Seim [2006]). Linearity may be
permissible in some applications of the entry model. However, in most markets the competitive
impact of the first rival entrant is likely to be different from the impact of subsequent ones
(Berry and Reiss [2007]). In models of vertical oligopoly or product differentiation, the impact
of rival entry into one category is likely to vary according to the presence of entrants in the other
categories. Thus, the studies on product differentiated markets by Mazzeo [2002] and Cohen and
Mazzeo [2007] employ a multi-dimensional step function specification for gk(·). I follow them in
specifying gk(·) as a partial step function in three dimensions.
The specification of gk(·) must be capable of capturing the key implications of economic
theory. As mentioned in section II, the appropriate theoretical framework for the generics
industry is the OSS raising-rivals’-costs model and its variants discussed in Riordan [2008],
Normann [2006], and Normann [2007]. An important implication of the OSS model is that
foreclosure effects are more likely to be present under market structures with few upstream
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firms. When there are many independent upstream firms, downward integration by one of
them will not have a significant foreclosure effect. For instance, suppose that there are three
upstream units and two downstream units in the market. Vertical integration by one upstream-
downstream pair does not cause foreclosure, because the remaining upstream firms will carry on
with their Bertrand price competition (Reiffen [1992]).
This suggest that our hypothesis tests should place emphasis on “small’ market structures
such as the two-by-two, one-by-two, and two-by-one configurations shown in figures 1, 2, and
3, respectively. One valid test would be to compare firm i’s independent upstream profits in
market m under the following market structures (note that NUmi does not account for firm i’s
entry decision): NDmiNUmi
NVmi
 ∈

21
0
 ,
10
1
 .
The vector
[
2 1 0
]
describes the situation in panel (i) of figure 1, with firm i as either
U1 or U2 facing two downstream customers and one upstream rival.
[
1 0 1
]
is the situation in
panel (ii) of the same figure, with U2 facing one downstream customer and a vertically integrated
rival. The prediction from the OSS model is that firm i’s upstream profits are higher in the
vertically integrated market—panel (ii)—than in the vertically separated market—panel (i)—
when foreclosure effects are present. This is because the vertically integrated firm sets a high
price for its intermediate product, giving the independent upstream firm room to raise its price.
This prediction is testable with non-experimental data, because the foreclosure and efficiency
effects work in opposite directions. Efficiency effects make the vertically integrated firm more
competitive so that the independent upstream firm’s profit is pushed down. This does imply that
foreclosure effects may be canceled out by efficiency effects, However, the more serious problem
of confounding the two effects is avoided.14 Because independent upstream profits increase in
response to vertical integration only in the presence of foreclosure effects, the test is capable
of rejecting the null hypothesis of “no foreclosure”. On the other hand, it is not capable of
rejecting the hypothesis that foreclosure effects exist.
Another test concerns the impact of vertical integration on independent downstream profits
in the two-by-two setting. The OSS model with no efficiency effects predicts that independent
downstream firms are harmed by vertical integration. Most of the other foreclosure models make
the same prediction. However, there is one situation in which independent downstream profit
14The problem that foreclosure effects may be cancelled out by efficiency effects is also faced by researchers
who measure the direct effect of vertical integration on market outcomes.
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may increase as a result of vertical integration by the rival pair. It is characterized by: (i) a
large efficiency effect from vertical integration, (ii) the inability of the vertically integrated firm
to commit to a high intermediate good price (i.e., a clear absence of vertical foreclosure), and
(iii) some degree of product differentiation between the intermediate goods produced by the
two upstream units. In this setting, the vertically integrated firm might sell the intermediate
good to the independent downstream firm at a lower price than what would have been charged
under vertical separation. Thus, if we find that vertical integration in the two-by-two market
structure is associated with higher independent downstream profits, then we can conclude that
foreclosure effects do not exist. This is because vertical integration can benefit independent
downstream firms only in the absence of foreclosure effects.15 In contrast to the test described
in the previous paragraph, the test concerning upstrearm rival profits is capable of rejecting
the hypothesis that foreclosure effects exist. It cannot, however, reject the null hypothesis that
there is no foreclosure.
In order to capture vertical rival effects in small market structures such as the two-by-two,
I specify the post-entry profit equations as follows:
pimiD = h(xmi;ωD)
+ δDD × number of upstream entrants
+ δDU1 × presence of first upstream entrant (no vertical entrants)
+ δDU2 × presence of first upstream entrant (one vertical entrant)
+ δDU3 × number of additional upstream entrants
+ δDV 1 × presence of first vertical entrant
+ δDV 2 × number of additional vertical entrants
+ miD.
(2)
15For this reason, we do not have to worry about foreclosure effects being cancelled out by efficiency effects.
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pimiU = h(xmi;ωU )
+ δUD1 × presence of first downstream entrant (no vertical entrants)
+ δUD2 × presence of first downstream entrant (one vertical entrant)
+ δUD3 × number of additional downstream entrants
+ δUU × number of upstream entrants
+ δUV 1 × presence of first vertical entrant
+ δUV 2 × number of additional vertical entrants
+ miU .
(3)
pimiV = h(xmi;ωV )
+ δV D × number of downstream entrants
+ δV U1 × number of upstream entrants
(no downstream entrants; no vertical entrants)
+ δV U2 × number of upstream entrants
(no downstream entrants; one or more vertical entrants)
+ δV U3 × number of upstream entrants(one or more downstream entrants)
+ δV V × number of vertical entrants
+ miV .
(4)
With these specifications, it is possible to compare firm profits under different market struc-
tures. For instance in the two-by-two market configuration, the impact of vertical integration
on independent upstream rivals can be calcuated as (δUD2 + δUV 1)− (δUD1 + δUD3 + δUU ). Such
quantities will form the basis for hypothesis testing.
III.3 Choice of market and firm characteristics
The h(·) term in (1) represents the effect of various market and firm characteristics on profits.
I refer to the existing literature for the choice of covariates to be included in xmi. Following
Scott Morton [1999] and Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja [2008], I use the total market revenue for
each drug (MktRev) as a measure of market size. It is measured for the year just prior to generic
entry. Another important market characteristic is the height of entry barriers. I use the number
of patents for each drug held by the originator pharmaceutical company (OrigPat) as a measure
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of entry barrier height. I also use two sets of dummy variables: one for broad therapeutic classes
(e.g., cardiovascular agents, central nervous system agents); another for the year in which first
generic entry occured (from 1997 to 2005).
In terms of firm characteristics, Scott Morton [1999] and Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja
[2008] suggest that firm experience is an important determinant of entry behavior. For the
downstream segment, I use as measures of experience the number of downstream markets entered
by firm i during each of the five years prior to facing the entry opportunity in market m:
DownExpmi,−s, s = 0, ..., 4. For the upstream, I use the number of upstream markets entered
by firm i during each of the seven years prior to entry opportunity m: UpExpmi,−s, s = 0, ..., 6.
I allow the learning effects of experience to deteroriorate over time (Benkard [2000]). Thus,
the past experience variables depreciate with constant factors ρD and ρU for downstream and
upstream, respectively. Due to the allowance for experience depreciation, h(·) has the following
nonlinear specification:
h(xmi;ωk) = βk0 + βk,MktRev MktRevm + βk,OrigPat OrigPatm
+ βk,DownExp
4∑
s=0
ρsD DownExpi,−s + βk,UpExp
6∑
s=0
ρsU UpExpi,−s
(5)
where ωk ≡ (βk, ρD, ρU ). I assume that upstream experience has no bearing on the firm’s
profit as an independent downstream entrant. Hence, I set βD,UpExp = 0. Similarly, I set
βU,DownExp = 0.
IV Estimation Strategy
IV.1 Equilibrium finding algorithm
The first step in estimation is to find the Nash equilibrium market structures under a given set
of parameter candidate values. I restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. The equilibrium
finding routine involves plugging in various candidate market structures into each potential
entrant’s set of payoff equations (2)-(4), along with the parameter candidate values and a set of
values for the error terms, and seeing whether or not the resulting payoffs satisfy the equilibrium
conditions.
Comparing the fitted values for firm payoffs
For each candidate market structure vector N(0)c ≡
[
NDc N
U
c N
V
c
]T, three additional vectors
are generated:
N(1)c =
NDc − 1NUc
NVc
 ,N(2)c =
 NDcNUc − 1
NVc
 ,N(3)c =
 NDcNUc
NVc − 1
 .
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These four vectors are plugged into each potential entrant’s payoff equations to generate fitted
values for its payoffs. These fitted values are then compared with each other to predict each
firm’s action.
As a demonstration, firm i’s fitted payoff values in market m under N(1)c , for a particular
set of parameter candidate values and a particular set of values for the error terms, are:
pimik
(
N(1)c ; θ˜, ˜
)
= h (xmi, ω˜k) + gk
(
N(1)c ; δ˜k
)
+ ˜mik, k ∈ K.
where θ ≡ (ω, δ) and the tilde indicates specific values for each object. For brevity, I suppress the
arguments of the payoff function to use the shorthand: pi(t)mik ≡ pimik
(
N(t)c ; θ˜, ˜
)
, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Given the fitted payoff values, firm i finds it profit maximal to be an independent downstream
entrant in market m if pi(1)miD > 0 and pi
(1)
miD = maxk pi
(1)
mik.
Firm i can also maximize its profit by being an independent upstream entrant if pi(2)miU > 0
and pi(2)miU = maxk pi
(2)
mik. Likewise, vertically integrated entry may be firm i’s optimal choice
if pi(3)miV > 0 and pi
(3)
miV = maxk pi
(3)
mik. In fact, it is possible that all entry categories are profit
maximal choices for firm i in an equilibrium characterized by market structure N(0)c . In addition,
“not entering” is a profit maximal choice for firm i if pi(0)mik ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ K.
Checking if a candidate market structure satisfies equilibrium conditions
The preceding suggests that for each firm, multiple actions can be optimal under a given can-
didate market structure. This complicates the equilibrium finding procedure. For each market
m, the following four steps are followed in order to find out if the candidate market structure
N(0)c is an equilibrium.
1. Generate four matrices correponding to the four vectors N(t)c , t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}:
Π(t)m =

pi
(t)
m1D pi
(t)
m1U pi
(t)
m1V
pi
(t)
m2D pi
(t)
m2U pi
(t)
m2V
...
...
...
pi
(t)
mID pi
(t)
mIU pi
(t)
mIV
 , t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
where I is the number of firms in the sample and firms are indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., I. If
firm i is not a potential entrant into category k of market m, then pi(t)mik is automatically
set to zero for all t.16
2. From each of the three matrices Π(t)m , t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, create a vector of length I called ψ(t)m .
This vector is equivalent to the tth column of Π(t)m except that the ith element of ψ
(t)
m is
16The definition of potential entrants is discussed in section V.
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set to zero if pi(t)mi,κ(t) 6= maxk pi
(t)
mik or if pi
(t)
mi,κ(t) < 0, where
κ(t) =

D if t = 1
U if t = 2
V if t = 3.
3. Merge the three vectors ψ(t)m column-wise to form the I × 3 matrix Ψm. It would look
something like this:
Ψm =

pi
(1)
m1D 0 0
0 pi(2)m2U pi
(3)
m2V
...
...
...
0 pi(2)mIU 0

This particular example shows that D is a profit maximal action for firm 1, firm 2’s optimal
actions include U and V , and an optimal action for firm I is U .
4. The candidate market structure N(0)c is an equilibrium for market m if and only if there
exists some vector em of length I, with elements emi, i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, ..., I}, such that the
following four conditions are satisfied:
(a)
∑
i 1{emi = κ−1(k)} = Nkc , ∀k ∈ K and
κ−1(k) =

1 if k = D
2 if k = U
3 if k = V.
(b)
∑
i 1{emi = 0} = I −
∑
kN
k
c .
(c) Ψm(i, t) 6= 0 if emi = t, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
(d) Π(0)m (i, t) ≤ 0 if emi = 0, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
em is an equilibrium action profile characterized by market structure N
(0)
c . Specifically,
the ith element of em provides a numerical code for the action of firm i, as follows:
emi =

0 if i does not enter
1 if i enters as independent downstream
2 if i enters as independent upstream
3 if i enters as vertically integrated.
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Conditions (a) and (b) simply say that the market structure implied by em must be N
(0)
c .
Condition (c) says the following: if em indicates that firm i enters category k, then it must be
the case that k is the profit maximal action for i, given that the actions of its rivals is summarized
by N(κ
−1(k))
c . This condition guarantees that all entrants make positive profits, and that they
are profit maximizing. Finally, condition (d) ensures that non-entering firms would make a loss
if they were to enter.
Several different algorithms can be devised for finding the equilibrium action profile em.
The one I employ chooses equilibrium actions one firm at a time, starting with the element in
Ψm with the highest value, and moving towards the element with the lowest value. Running this
algorithm for every market in the sample, for every market structure candidate, is extremely
time-consuming.17 Several simple-to-calculate criteria are used to screen out most market struc-
ture candidates before evaluating them rigorously. Still, the computational burden is quite high
due to the large number of parameter iterations that I must go through during estimation. For
this reason, I run the algorithm only for the market structures observed in the data. For in-
stance, if the observed structure for market m is Nm =
[
4 2 1
]
, I use the equilibrium finding
algorithm to check whether or not
[
4 2 1
]
is an equilibrium structure for market m under the
given parameter values.
IV.2 Constructing the simulated likelihood
Exact likelihoods are difficult to compute for my model, because there is no analytical expression
for the probability of observing a given market structure. Fortunately, simulated likelihoods can
be constructed. This involves taking multiple sets of draws for the random error terms in the
payoff equations.
I use a Halton sequence to generate R draws of the error term vector, which has length∑
m #(Im) × 3 where #(Im) is the number of elements in Im. Each element of the vector
is assigned to a specific category of a specific market, for a specific firm. The draws have
a multivariate standard normal distribution and I assume zero correlation among the error
terms.18 The number of draws, R, is set to 100.
Let Mo be the M × 3 matrix of observed market structures, with each row corresponding
to a market and each column corresponding to an element of {D,U, V }. Also, let µ(θ˜,m, r) be a
17As described in the next subsection, my simulation-based estimator uses 100 sets of draws for the random
error terms. Multiplying this by the number of markets in the data (91) and the number of possible market
structures (more than 2,000), we find that the algorithm would have to be run more than 18 million times for
each iteration of the parameter candidate values.
18At the cost of increasing the number of parameters, correlations among the elements of the vector can be
introduced (Train [2003]).
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correspondence that gives, for parameter candidate θ˜, market m, and the rth draw of the error
term vector the set of predicted equilibrium market structures. µ(·) is essentially the equilibrium
finding algorithm. Given θ˜ and draw r, I obtain the value of an “equilibrium indicator function”
for each market m, defined as:
q(θ˜,m, r) =
{
1 if Mom ∈ µ(θ˜,m, r)
0 otherwise.
The simulated likelihood is then calculated as
SL(θ˜) =
∏
m
∑
r q(θ˜,m, r)
R
. (6)
The only information required for computing (6) is whether or not the observed equilibrium is
included in µ(θ˜,m, r) for all m and r; it is not necessary to obtain all the elements in µ(θ˜,m, r).
Before moving on, there are two issues that need to be addressed. The first pertains to the
zero likelihood problem. This refers to the possibility that in some market, none of the draws
yield the observed market structure as an equilibrium. The likelihood contribution of such a
market is zero, which means that the entire likelihood is driven down to zero regardless of the
value of other markets’ likelihood contributions. Several methods have been proposed to avoid
this problem, such as discarding the observations that have a zero likelihood contribution, or
altering the underlying theoretical model so that all outcomes in the data have some probability
of occurring (El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey [1993]). The solution I adopt is somewhat ad
hoc, but it is easy to implement and requires no change in the underlying model. I augment
the likelihood contribution of each market with a value of 1R , thereby calculating the following
modified simulated likelihood:
SˇL(θ˜) =
∏
m
1 +
∑
r q(θ˜,m, r)
R
. (7)
This function does not satisfy the requirements of a likelihood; in particular, it does not integrate
to one over the parameter space. It is even possible for the value of (7) to surpass one, if all draws
correctly predict the observed market structure. However, these problems are likely to be less
serious within the Bayesian framework that I adopt, because what matters for Bayesian inference
is the ratio between densities at different points and not their absolute values. It is also hoped
that near the center of the parameter vector’s distribution (either the sampling distribution or
the posterior distribution, depending on whether one takes a frequentist or Bayesian stance),
the simulated likelihood (6) will have a nonzero value, so that the zero likelihood problem goes
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away.19
The second issue that needs to be addressed is that of equilibrium multiplicity. At its worst,
the existence of multiple equiilibria can render the econometric exercise useless. For instance,
consider a bilateral vertical entry model with only one potential entrant in each of the vertical
segments. Under a wide range of parameter values, the model predicts exactly two equilibria:
(enter, enter) and (not enter, not enter). The realized market structure will always be one of
the two, and the observations provide little information about the parameters (Tamer [2003]).
In other entry game situations, the problem is less serious. In the horizontal entry game with
homogeneous firms, multiple equilibria do occur but the equilibria are generally characterized
by the same number of entrants (Bresnahan and Reiss [1991a]). In the vertical entry model,
multiple equilibria are sometimes characterized by different numbers of entrants. However,
the set of multiple equilibria generally forms only a small subset of the set of possible market
structures (Elberfeld [2002]). Thus, econometric analysis is useful in the sense that the set of
likely outcomes is narrowed down substantially. Still, one must keep in mind that the model
assigns probabilities not to an individual market structure, but to an outcome that contains the
given market structure as one possible equilibrium (Ciliberto and Tamer [2009]).
IV.3 Bayesian procedures
I use the simulated likelihoods to conduct Bayesian inference. Specifically, I assume a prior
distribution for the model parameters with density p(θ). The density of the posterior distribution
of θ is proportional to the product of the (modified) simulated likelihood and the prior density:
p(θ|Y) ∝ SˇL(θ)p(θ)
where Y denotes the data, including market and firm charactersitics as well as market structure
outcomes. SˇL(θ) is derived from the data as described in the previous subsection. The posterior
distribution is used to make inferences about the parameter values. Specifically, it is used to
construct “highest posterior density (HPD)” sets for individual parameters and functions of
parameters. The HPD sets are analogous to the confidence intervals in frequentist econometrics.
The first step of the Bayesian procedure is to define the prior distribution. I use an
improper prior distribution in which the elements of βk and δk, k ∈ {D,U, V } are distributed
19Perhaps a better solution would be to utilize moment conditions, rather than the likelihood, to construct the
criterion function. For instance, one can calculate the difference between the predicted market structure and the
observed market structure, and interact it with the exogenous variables to construct a set of moment conditions.
This method, used in the entry game context by Berry [1992] and Jia [2008], requires the econometrician to find
all equilibria of the entry game, as well as to devise a rule for choosing a single equilibrium.
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uniformly on the real number line.20 The two remaining parameters, ρD and ρU , are given
uniform priors on the interval [0, 1]. Because there is no analytical expression for the posterior
density, I sample from the posterior distribution by utilizing the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
to construct a Markov chain. I choose the step size within the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
so that the acceptance rate is around 30 percent.21
V Data
The model is estimated using data for the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The data con-
sists of drug markets, each having an upstream segment manufacturing active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) and a downstream segment manufacturing finished formulations. The mar-
kets are selected from a database of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that contains
the population of all drug approvals. I select a subset of drug markets that opened up to generic
competition between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2005. I further narrow down to mar-
kets in which the relationship between the upstream and downstream segments is relatively
straightforward. This involves restricting the sample to the first dosage form to open up to
generic competition for each API. I also restrict the sample to oral dosage forms—tablets and
capsules, including extended-release versions. This leaves 91 downstream markets, each defined
by a distinct combination of an API and a dosage form. There are 87 corresponding upstream
markets, each defined by a distinct API. For four APIs (acyclovir, fluoxetine hydrochloride,
gabapentin, and terazosin hydrochloride), two different dosage forms went generic on the same
day. In these cases, I consider different dosage forms of the same API to constitute independent
market observations, and allow each of them to be combined with data for their respective API
markets. Thus, for the four APIs mentioned above, the same upstream market data are used
twice.22 The Data Appendix contains further details on how the markets are selected, as well as
a list of the drugs. The actual data was downloaded from a proprietary database called Newport
SourcingTM, developed and maintained by Thomson Reuters.
V.1 Entry indicator
In order to define market entry, it is first necessary to define a date on which each drug market
opens up to generic competition. Previous authors such as Scott Morton [1999] use the approval
date of the first generic product as the market opening date. After comparing product approval
20This is an improper distribution in the sense that it does not integrate to one.
21In the run used to construct the presented results, the acceptance rate is 31.3 percent.
22Alternatively, I can choose to keep only one dosage form for each of the four APIs. Doing so does not alter
the results.
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dates with product launch dates, I find that this definition is not always appropriate.23 In some
cases, the first approved generic product is not marketed until serveral months after approval.
During those months, the second and later generic products are not approved by the FDA.
On the other hand, I find a few cases in which drugs that appear to be generics are launched
before being approved. The former situation arises when pending patent litigation between the
generic entrant and the originator firm, or an out-of-court settlement between the two parties,
prevents the generic from entering immediately upon approval. The latter situation is related
to a phenomenon known as “authorized generics”, whereby the originator firm licenses a generic
company to sell the product under the originator’s own FDA approval. In order to accomodate
such special cases, I define the market opening date as the first generic approval date or the first
generic launch date, whichever is later.
Firm-level entry actions are defined on the basis of market opening dates. Specifically, a
generic firm is considered to have entered the downstream segment if its application for approval
to market a generic finished formulation, called an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),
is approved by the FDA either before the market opening date, or not later than one year after
the market opening date. The narrow window is justified on the grounds that entry timing is an
important determinant of profits in generic drug markets; because prices fall rapidly in response
to additional entry (Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz [1991]; Reiffen and Ward [2005]), most firms
enter in the beginning stages of the market.
In the upstream segment, a generic firm is deemed to have entered a market if it submits to
the FDA a document, called a Drug Master File (DMF), that describes how the firm manufac-
tures the API used in that market. To be considered as an entry event, the submission must be
made before the market opening date, or no later than one year after the market opening date24.
A vertically integrated entry event is defined by the simultaneous occurence of downstream entry
and upstream entry.
V.2 Potential entrants
I identify potential entrants in market m as follows. Let us define fdateil as the first recorded
entry date of firm i into segment l ∈ {D,U} of any market, including those outside the sample
but excluding market m itself. ldateil is similarly defined as firm i’s last recorded entry date in
segment l. Firm i is identified as a potential downstream entrant of market m if fdateiD is on
or before the market opening date for market m and ldateiD is not more than five years before
23Product launch dates were obtained from the Newport database.
24Further details on DMFs and ANDAs are found in the Data Appendix.
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the market opening date. Thus, I allow a firm to remain a potential downstream entrant for five
years after its last entry. Similarly, firm i is identified as a potential upstream entrant of market
m if fdateiU is on or before the market opening date and ldateiU is not more than seven years
before the market opening date. Potential entrant status in the upstream segment is allowed
to last for seven years after the last entry event. The reason for setting a wider window for
potential upstream entrants is that upstream entry often occurs a few years before the market
opening date. Firm i is a potential vertically integrated entrant of market m if and only if it is
a potential downstream entrant as well as a potential upstream entrant.
Using the above definition of potential entrants, I obtain a dataset of 104 firms facing 8,127
choice situations. Each choice situation is a market-firm pair where a firm chooses whether or
not to enter, and which segment(s) to enter. Not all choice situations involve the same choice set,
because in a number of cases the firm is a potential entrant in only one of the segments. Table 2
classifies the choice situations according to the alternatives faced and the choices actually made.
There are nine instances—three for potential downstream-only entrants and six for potential
upstream-only entrants—where a firm enters a segment in which it is not a potential entrant.
Such cases can be prevented by broadly defining potential entrants. However, such an adjustment
substantially reduces entry probabilities and lowers the quality of the estimates. I consider the
misclassification rates implied by table 2 to be acceptably low, and accordingly make adjustments
to the data. Specifically, potential downstream-only entrants who enter as independent upstream
and potential upstream-only entrants who enter as independent downstream are both deemed
not to have entered. Potential downstream-only entrants who make a vertically integrated entry
are deemed only to have entered the downstream segment, and their upstream counterparts are
treated similarly.
V.3 Market size
Following Scott Morton [1999], I measure market size by the total revenue for a drug in the
US market during the year prior to the first generic entry date. I calculate the revenue figures
from a data source called the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). MEPS is a large-scale
annual survey of households co-sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research Quality and
the National Center for Health Statistics. It has been conducted since 1996, asking respondents
detalied information about their medical expenditures and confirming those responses with the
respondents’ pharmacies25. The MEPS data consists of several different files, and one of them,
25See Cohen, Monheit, Beauregard, Cohen, Lefkowitz, Potter, Sommers, Taylor, and Arnett [1996]. Other
economics articles using the MEPS data include Lichtenberg [2001], Rizzo and Zeckhauser [2005], and Acemoglu
and Linn [2004].
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called the Prescribed Medicines File contains information on the use and purchase of prescription
drugs. As an example, in the 2004 Prescribed Medicines file (the latest year used in my study),
there are a total of 317,065 records. Each record represents a single drug acquisition event, and
contains data on drug characteristics such as active ingredient and strength. The quantity and
value (including both insurance and out-of-pocket payments) of the transaction is also recorded.
The same patient-drug pair appear more than once in the same file if the patient refills his or her
prescription. Each record is assigned a weight based on the MEPS stratified sampling scheme.
I apply such weights to estimate the national total revenue for each drug in my dataset, for the
years 1996-2005.
Despite the large sample size, the national revenues estimated from MEPS data fluctuate
significantly across years due to sampling variability. I therefore obtain smoothed estimates
of market revenue by regressing the MEPS estimates on a time trend, after deflating the time
series data using the consumer price index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (base period 1982-
84). The predicted value for the year prior to generic entry is used as the market size variable.
Following Mazzeo [2002], the variable is transformed into the natural logarithm of the ratio to
its mean (see the notes in table 3) and assigned the name MktRev. For smaller drug markets
(i.e., those for which few drug acquisition events are recorded), the MEPS estimate for total
revenue fluctuates so widely that it does not seem advisable to use it as data. Therefore, I set a
cutoff level of market revenue such that drug markets with predicted market revenues below it
are assigned a zero value for MktRev. I introduce a dummy variable (NoRevData) that equals
one for markets with zero market revenue values, so in effect smaller markets are provided with
a common intercept. The cutoff level is chosen as 30 million in 1982-84 dollars.
V.4 Originator patents
In the pharmaceutical industry, originator firms often file multiple patents for one product.
In addition to the basic product patent covering the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API),
there can be several secondary patents covering specific aspects of the drug, such as a process
for manufacturing the active ingredient, a chemical form of the API, or a particular finished
formulation. Such patents mostly arise during the drug development stage, after the drug
compound has been discovered and patented, but prior to approval and marketing of the new
drug. This implies that secondary patents generally expire at a later date than the basic patent,
creating an entry barrier that the generic entrants must either accept, circumvent, or invalidate.
If a secondary patent covers a specific chemical form of the API, a generic entrant must
either invalidate the patent or circumvent it by manufacturing a novel unpatented form or an
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older unprotected form.26 A secondary patent on a process for manufacturing the API can also
pose a significant entry barrier. For instance, if the process disclosed in the basic patent is
not suitable for commercial scale production, the originator (or its API supplier) develops and
patents alternative processes, some of which are used for actual production (Ma´ndi [2003]). The
generic API manufacturer must circumvent or invalidate such process patents in order to sell its
product without legal liability.
I count the number of patents held by the originator firm under the assumption that
this measures the height of entry barriers created by secondary patents. In order to do so, I
must first identify the originator for each drug. There are sometimes multiple firms involved
in the development of a single drug, and it may not be possible to identify a single firm as
the originator. Moreover, new drugs developed by foreign firms are sometimes licensed out to
local pharmaceutical companies with better marketing infrastructure, so the sponsor of a new
drug in the US may not necessarily be its innovator. To identify originator patents with as
much accuracy as possible, I apply the following steps. First, for each drug I group all its
associated US patents according to their assignees. This gives a list of patent holders as well
as the number of patents held by each. Second, for each drug I identify the recipient of the
first FDA approval—not the ANDA but the New Drug Application (NDA) approval—as well
as the first launchers in the following markets: France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US.
Lastly, I identify the first approval receipients and first launchers that are also US patent holders,
and sum up their patent counts to form the originator patent variable. The patent variable is
subjected to the same transformation as the market revenue variable, and it is assigned the
name OrigPat. Of the 91 drug markets in the data, there are six for which no originator patent
counts could be generated. For these observations, a value of 0.1 was assigned before applying
the transformation.
V.5 Firm experience
The sole observable firm characteristic in my data is previous entry experience. Downstream
entry experience is measured by the number of oral dosage form markets entered by the firm in
each of the five years prior to the market opening date. The annual entry counts are denoted as
DownExp−s, s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Upstream experience is measured by the number of distinct APIs
for which the firm submitted a Drug Master File in each of the seven years preceding the market
opening date. The variables are named UpExp−s, s = 0, 1, ..., 6. In constructing the two sets of
26An interesting description of such secondary product patents is found in Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in
SmithKline Becham v. Apotex, District Court, Northern District of Illinois, filed March 3, 2003.
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variables, the past entries to be counted are not restricted to the 91 drugs in the sample. Also,
when measuring the firm’s entry experience variables for market m, entry into market m itself
is not counted. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the explanatory variables.
VI Results
I generate a Markov chain of 40,000 realizations from the posterior distribution of the parameters.
The first 30,000 realizations are discarded as a burn-in period, and the last 10,000 are used for
analysis. Table 4 presents some informal measures of goodness-of-fit when the modes of the
marginal posterior distributions are used as parameter values, and 100 draws from the Halton
sequence are used as simulated random error terms. The fitted payoff values are used to check
if the market structures observed in the data are predicted as equilibria of the vertical entry
game. The first row of table 4 shows that of the 91 markets in the dataset, 31 (34.07 percent)
have at least one draw in which the observed market structure is contained in the (possibly non-
singleton) set of equilibria. When we consider individual market-draw combinations separately,
it is found that the rate of correct prediction is 4.26 percent (388 out of 9,100 market-draw
combinations).
VI.1 Single parameters
Table 5 presents, for each parameter, the mode and 95 percent highest posterior density (HPD)
sets of the marginal posterior distributions. Each HPD set is constructed by drawing a kernel
smoothed density for the marginal posterior distribution, and finding a cutoff level such that
the set of points with a density higher than the cutoff constitute 95 percent of the posterior
distribution (Lancaster [2004]).27
The coefficients on the three market characteristic variables mostly have the expected sign,
but there are two exceptions: the coefficient on MktRev in the downstream payoff equation
is negative, and that on OrigPat is positive in the upstream payoff equation. Otherwise, it is
found that larger market size is associated with higher profits, while originator patents tend
to reduce downstream profits. Firms’ entry experience is found to depreciate each year at a
rate of between 34 and 54 percent, as seen from the estimates for ρD and ρU . The composite
downstream experience term has a positive effect on both vertical and independent downstream
profits. The composite upstream experience term also has a positive effect, but only for vertically
integrated entrants.
27For a graphical illustration, see figures 4 and 5.
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The HPD sets for the δ parameters are quite illuminating. In all three equations, the effect
of rival entry in the same category (δDD, δUU , and δV V ) is significantly negative, as expected.
Another expected result is that upstream entry and downstream entry are complementary;
independent entrants in each vertical segment benefit when someone else enters the other segment
independently. In other words, “matching” entry is universally welcomed.
For the other δ parameters, there is no a priori reason to expect a particular sign. One
interesting result is that independent downstream entrants are not harmed by vertically inte-
grated rivals, as can be seen from δDV 1 being significantly positive and δDV 2 not being different
from zero. On the other hand, δUV 1 and δUV 2 are both negative, indicating that independent
upstream entrants are hurt by vertically integrated rivals. These findings suggest that vertically
integrated entrants compete with independent rivals primarily in the upstream segment. This
is consistent with industry practice wherein vertically integrated firms such as Teva often sell
active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) to their downstream rivals (e.g., Teva Pharmaceuti-
cal Industries [2005]). One reason for doing so may be the scale economies inherent in API
production, something that is not incorporated into the simple theoretical models of vertical
foreclosure.
Turning to the vertical payoff equation, it is found that independent rival entry in the
downstream benefits vertically integrated firms. This is consistent with downstream rivals also
being the buyers of the APIs produced by vertically integrated firms. The effect of independent
upstream entry on vertically integrated profits is more ambivalent. Vertically integrated profits
are not hurt by independent upstream rivals when there are no independent downstream firms.
In fact, the profits of a sole vertical firm increases with upstream entry (i.e., δV U1 is positive),
presumably because the upstream firm offers an alternative source of API supply. These findings
are not surprising, because upstream rivals in the absence of downstream customers pose no
competitive threat to the vertical firm. Independent upstream entry does have a negative impact
on vertical profits when downstream firms are also present (i.e., δV U3 is negative). This is
consistent with independent upstream firms and vertically integrated firms competing for the
business of downstream customers.
VI.2 Testing foreclosure theory
Table 6 and figures 4 and 5 present the posterior modes and HPD intervals for specific linear
combinations of the δ parameters. The linear combinations are designed to measure the impact,
on independent firms, of vertical integration by a pair of firms in small market structures.
The first row of table 6 and panel (i) of figure 4 both show the impact of vertical integration
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on independent downstream rivals in a two-by-two market. The effect is significantly positive.
In terms of figure 1, firm D2 is better off in panel (ii) than in panel (i). This is an important
finding from the viewpoint of foreclosure theory. As discussed in section III, vertical integration
can benefit independent downstream firms only in the absence of foreclosure effects. Thus, the
finding allows us to reject foreclosure effects as a general tendency in the generic pharmaceutical
industry. At the same time, this finding strongly supports the existence of efficiency effects
through vertical integration.
Further support for efficiency effects is found in the second row of table 6 and panel (ii) of
figure 4. They imply that in the one-by-two market structure (figure 2), the independent down-
stream firm is better off if the upstream unit is vertically integrated. This is surprising, given
that vertical integration facilitates commitment by the upstream firm to restrict supply. While
the monopoly restoration theory of Rey and Tirole [2007] cannot be rejected, any foreclosure
effects that may exist are cancelled out by efficiency effects.
Rows three and four of table 6 and figure 5 present the effect of vertical integration on
independent upstream profits in the two-by-two and two-by-one market structures. The effects
are unambiguously negative. Although the results cannot be used to reject the hypothesis of “no
foreclosure”, they lend further support to the existence of strong efficiency effects. These results
also support the notion that vertically integrated firms compete vigorously against independent
upstream firms in the API market. In the two-by-one market structure (figure 3), it is possible
that the vertically integrated firm forecloses the upstream rival from access to the downstream
market. However, it is more likely that the vertically firm uses the upstream rival as an additional
supply source, as discussed in the previous subsection.
VI.3 Simulating a ban on vertically integrated entry
The preceding results indicate that firms’ entry actions are consistent with the existence of
signficant efficiency effects and the absence of foreclosure effects. This implies that vertical
integration in this industry is unlikely to be anticompetitive from a static point of view. Vertical
integration can have an anticompetitive dynamic effect, however, if independent upstream firms
are deterred from entering when they anticipate tough competition from vertically integrated
rivals. I examine this possibility by conducting a policy simulation. Specifically, I simulate
the effect of a counterfactual policy that bans any firm from entering both vertical segments
of the same market. To my knowledge, no such ban has been contemplated for the generic
pharmaceutical industry, but policy makers may well consider it if the effects are found to be
beneficial.
30
In order to simulate the effect of the policy, I run two sets of predictions on equilibrium
market structures. In the first set, firms are allowed to enter as a vertically integrated entity. This
is the status quo. In the second set, I simulate the policy by removing “vertically integrated
entry” from the choice set of each potential entrant. For both sets, I make predictions for
100 draws of the error term vector (the same draws that are used to generate the simulated
likelihoods), and for each draw I compute all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the entry game.
The parameter values that I use are the modes of the marginal posterior distributions.
Before turning to the simulation results, table 7 presents statistics regarding the multiplic-
ity and existence of equilibria for the simulation runs in which vertically integration was allowed.
These give us some idea of the difficulties inherent in the estimation of a vertical merger game.
Equilibrium multiplicity is widespread, with only six percent of the market-draw pairs exhibiting
a unique Nash equilibrium. The average number of equilibria is 5.72, with some market-draws
having as many as 20 equilibria. The prevalence of multiplicity is due to the strong complemen-
tarity between independent upstream entry and independent downstream entry. In other words,
coordination problems appear to be a defining feature of the entry game. The non-existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is observed in only 0.2 percent of the market-draw combina-
tions. It is likely that a unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists in such cases. In all of the
markets, I was able to find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for at least one of the draws. Thus,
non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium does not appear to be a significant problem in my
model.
Figure 6 presents the results of policy simulation. In order to compare the predicted
equilibrium market structures with and without the ban on vertically integrated entry, I count
the number of entrants that are predicted to be present in each vertical segment. Thus, a
vertically integrated entrant is counted as both an upstream entrant and a downstream entrant.
For the 91 markets in the dataset, I calculate the mean number of entrants in each segment,
averaging over draws as well as over multiple equilibria. Each dot in figure 6 represents a
market, with the horizontal axis measuring the number of entrants under free vertical entry, and
the vertical axis measuring the number under the ban policy.
The results are illuminating. In panel (i) of figure 6, we see that in markets that are
characterized by fewer entrants, the number of downstream entrants tends to be smaller when
vertically integrated entry is banned The opposite appears to be case in markets characterized
by many downstream entrants; the number of downstream entrants is somewhat larger under
the ban. Turning to panel (ii) of the figure, we find that the effect of the policy is less clear-cut
for the upstream segment. It seems that there are slightly fewer upstream entrants under the
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ban in markets with less than five upstream units. On the other hand, in markets with six or
more upstream units, the ban appears to slightly raise the number of entrants.
From a policy point of view, the effect of the ban in smaller markets (i.e., those with
fewer entrants) is more important than its effect in larger markets. This is because the price
reduction effect of additional entry falls with the number of entrants. What, then, accounts
for the result that the ban reduces entry in smaller markets? One possibility is that because
vertical integration has significant efficiency effects, banning it has a negative impact on the
expected profits of potential downstream entrants. This reduces the firms’ incentive to enter the
downstream market. By depriving the opportunities for efficiency enhancement through vertical
integration, the ban also has the effect of reducing entry in the upstream. A tentative conclusion
that can be drawn from this exercise is that vertical integration does not appear to have any
anticompetitive dynamic effects that would raise concerns among policy makers.
Conclusion
Vertical foreclosure has been a subject of intense theoretical and empirical research, but evidence
supporting its existence or absence has been elusive. This study introduced a novel method
for testing foreclosure theory that is based on the estimation of vertical entry games. The
econometric model was applied to the US generic pharmaceutical industry, where markets open
up to competition as drug patents expire, and where some firms are vertically integrated between
the active pharmaceutical ingredient and finished formulation segments. The estimation results
indicate that vertical foreclosure is not a prevalent feature of this industry. The parameter
estimates were also used to simulate the effect of a counterfactual policy that bans vertically
integrated entry. The results suggest that such a policy has the effect of reducing entry in smaller
markets. Coupled with the finding of significant efficiency effects through vertical integration,
the simulation results advise against instituting such a ban.
The success of the model at testing foreclosure theory arises from the careful consideration
of two issues. First, the underlying theoretical model of vertical oligopoly was pinned down
before specifying the firms’ payoff equations. Second, the statistical tests were designed so
that the results would more easily shed light on foreclosure theory. Specifically, care was taken
in chooosing the quantities on which to base the tests, so that the efficiency effect of vertical
integration would not be confounded with the foreclosure effect.
Due to the computationally intensive nature of the equilibrium finding routine, the problem
of equilibrium multiplicity and that of zero likelihood were not treated with the best available
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econometric methods. The application of state-of-the-art techniques, particularly methods to
resolve the equilibrium multiplicity problem, is expected to further advance the usefulness of the
vertical entry model. There are other industries, such as the cement-concrete one, where entry
into vertical segments can be observed across a large number of markets. It is hoped that the
methodology presented in this study will be usefully applied to the study of vertical competition
in such industries.
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Table 1: Distribution of Entries by Category
Independent Independent
downstream upstream Vertical
Total number of entries
by individual firms
Teva (Israel) 32 3 22
Mylan (USA) 38 0 0
Ranbaxy (India) 5 10 14
Cipla (India) 0 15 0
Number of entries
per market
Mean 3.923 4.220 0.901
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 12 14 6
Notes:
Counts are based on a sample of 91 pharmaceutical markets in the US that
opened up to generic competition between 1997 and 2005. Definitions of down-
stream entry and upstream entry are provided in section V. Vertical entry implies
both downstream and upstream entry.
For each firm, the country name in brackets denotes the location of its global
headquarters. The entry counts for each firm do not include entries by acquired
companies prior to acquisition.
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Table 2: Classification of Choice Situations
Choice set
Actual choice {NE, D} {NE, U} {NE, D, U, V }
NE 1,256 4,148 1,896
D 125 3 230
U 1 300 81
V 2 3 82
Total 1,384 4,454 2,289
NE: Not enter, D: Independent downstream, U: Independent upstream, V:
Vertically integrated
The table shows the distribution of entry choices made by potential entrants.
Firms are grouped according to the choice set they faced.
The sample consists of 91 markets that opened up to generic competition
between January 1997 and December 2005.
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Table 3: Variable Description and Summary Statistics
Variable name Description Mean Min. Max.
MktRev a,b Market revenue in year −0.298 −1.982 1.501
before generic entry
NoRevData Indicator for 0.407 0 1
“no market revenue data”
OrigPat a,c Number of originator patents −0.565 −4.375 1.799
DownExp−s d Number of downstream entries 0 25
s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 in each of five previous years
UpExp−s d Number of upstream entries 0 43
s = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 in each of seven previous years
a These variables are transformed as follows. Let xm be the level of the untransformed
variable for market m. Then, the transformed value is ln
[
xm
(
∑
n xn)/M
]
.
b Before transformation, the average market revenue is 220 million in 1982-84 dollars.
The maximum is 987 million dollars.
c Before transformation, the average number of originator patents is 7.94, and the
maximum is 48. Observations with zero patents are given a value of 0.1 before
transformation.
d The experience variables are interacted with the experience depreciation parameters
to generate a scalar composite experience variable for each segment. The composite
experience variables are transformed in the same manner as MktRev and OrigPat.
In the addition to the above, dummy variables for year (1997-2005) and broad
therapeutic class are used. The broad classes, obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Mi-
cromedex directory, are the following: antineoplastic, blood modifier, cardiovascu-
lar, central nervous system, endocrine-metabolic, gastrointestinal, musculoskeletal,
and respiratory.
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Table 4: Informal Goodness of Fit
Total Number of
Number Correct Predictions Percentage
Markets 91 31a 34.07
Market-draw pairs 9,100 388b 4.26
Notes:
For each market, 100 sets of draws are taken from the multivariate standard normal distribution
to simulate the error terms in the payoff equations.
a The number of markets where there is at least one draw in which the observed market structure
is an equilibrium (among a possible multitude of equilibria).
b The number of market-draw pairs for which the observed market structure is one of the equilibria.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates
95%
Mode of Marginal Highest Posterior
Posterior Distribution∗ Density Set
Independent downstream payoff eq.
βMktRev −2.465 [−3.536, −1.389]
βNoRevData −2.805 [−3.456, −2.344]
βOrigPat −1.345 [−1.913, −0.885]
βDownExp 4.495 [ 3.238, 4.820]
δDD −5.575 [−5.959, −4.898]
δDU1 2.275 [ 0.878, 2.764]
δDU2 1.655 [ 0.840, 3.169]
δDU3 6.675 [ 6.502, 7.785]
δDV 1 5.135 [ 3.609, 5.441] ]
δDV 2 −0.995 [−1.143, 1.249] ]
Independent upstream payoff eq.
βMktRev 1.745 [ 1.517, 2.956]
βNoRevData −1.025 [−1.443, −0.337]
βOrigPat 0.925 [ 0.456, 1.286]
βUpExp −0.085 [−0.507, 1.021]
δUD1 4.215 [ 3.641, 4.948]
δUD2 1.735 [ 0.954, 3.624] ]
δUD3 4.095 [ 3.319, 4.341]
δUU −5.255 [−5.637, −4.139] ]
δUV 1 −2.105 [−2.926, −0.923] ]
δUV 2 −2.765 [−3.359, −2.190]
Vertical payoff eq.
βMktRev 2.525 [ 1.675, 3.564] ]
βNoRevData −4.835 [−5.211, −3.784]
βOrigPat −0.285 [−0.768, 1.634]
βDownExp 3.225 [ 1.747, 3.414]
βUpExp 3.635 [ 3.130, 4.438]
δV D 1.905 [ 1.460, 4.107] ]
δV U1 1.675 [ 0.438, 4.097] ]
δV U2 0.255 [−0.492, 1.647] ]
δV U3 −3.885 [−4.755, −1.647] ]
δV V −2.345 [−3.503, −1.959]
Experience Depreciation Rates
ρD 0.545 [ 0.463, 0.617]
ρU 0.595 [ 0.535, 0.663]
Notes:
See table 3 for definitions of the variables corresponding to the parameters. The δ parameters are
defined in equations (2), (3), and (4).
∗ The posterior modes were found using a grid with steps of 0.01. It is for this reason that the
third decimal place is always 5.
] indicates that the 95% highest posterior density set is disjoint.
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Table 6: Payoff Impact of Vertical Integration by a Rival Pair
95%
Mode of Marginal Highest Posterior
Posterior Distribution∗ Density Set
Independent downstream
in two-by-two market:
(δDU2 + δDV 1)− (δDD + δDU1 + δDU3) 2.935 [ 1.834, 3.917]
Independent downstream
in one-by-two market:
δDV 1 − (δDD + δDU1) 7.865 [ 6.658, 9.420]
Independent upstream
in two-by-two market:
(δUD2 + δUV 1)− (δUD1 + δUD3 + δUU ) −3.895 [−4.169, −1.340]
Independent upstream
in two-by-one market:
δUV 1 − (δUD1 + δUU ) −1.065 [−1.981, −0.270]
Notes:
The δ parameters are defined in equations (2), (3), and (4).
∗ The posterior modes were found using a grid with steps of 0.01. It is for this reason that the
third decimal place is always 5.
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Table 7: Existence and Multiplicity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Multiplicity
Average number of
predicted equilibria 5.722
per market-draw pair
Maximum number of
predicted equilibria 20
per market-draw pair
Number of market-draw pairs
with unique pure strategy Nash 542 (6.0%)
Equilibrium (PSNE) predicted
Non-existence of pure strategy equilibria
Number of market-draw pairs
with no PSNE predicted 18 (0.2%)
Number of markets for which
none of the draws have any 0
PSNE prediction
Notes:
For each market, equilbrium market structures are predicted using the modes
of the marginal posterior densities as parameter values. 100 sets of draws are
taken from the multivariate standard normal distribution to simulate the error
terms in the payoff equations. The total number of market-draw pairs is 9,100.
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Notes
(a) In panel (i), U1 and U2 are independent upstream firms who sell the inter-
mediate good to the two independent downstream firms, D1 and D2.
(b) In panel (ii), V is a vertically integrated firm who may or may not trade
the intermediate good with the independent firms, U2 and D2.
Figure 1: Vertical Structure in the Two-by-two Market Configuration
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Notes
(a) In panel (i), D1 and D2 purchase the intermediate good from the monop-
olist U1.
(b) In panel (ii), V may or may not sell the intermediate good to D2.
Figure 2: Vertical Structure in the One-by-two Market Configuration
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Notes
(a) In panel (i), U1 and U2 sell the intermediate good to the monopsonist D1.
(b) In panel (ii), V may or may not purchase the intermediate good from U2.
Figure 3: Vertical Structure in the Two-by-one Market Configuration
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Notes
(a) The bars form a density histogram of MCMC realizations for the impact
of rival vertical integration on independent downstream payoffs.
(b) The smoothed density is generated using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth
of 0.2 and 1,000 points of support.
(c) The shaded area represents the 95% highest posterior density interval de-
fined by the smoothed density.
Figure 4: Highest Posterior Density Intervals of Downstream Payoff Impact
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Notes
(a) The bars form a density histogram of MCMC realizations for the impact
of rival vertical integration on independent upstream payoffs.
(b) The smoothed density is generated using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth
of 0.2 and 1,000 points of support.
(c) The shaded area represents the 95% highest posterior density interval de-
fined by the smoothed density.
Figure 5: Highest Posterior Density Intervals of Upstream Payoff Impact
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(ii) Mean Predicted Number of Upstream Entrants
Notes
(a) Each dot represents a market.
(b) The marginal posterior modes are used as parameter values to predict the
equilibium market structure for each market under both “Vertical Entry
Allowed” and “Vertical Entry Prohibited”.
(c) For comparability, each vertically integrated entry in the “Vertical Entry
Allowed” scenario is recounted as a pair consisting of one independent
upstream and one independent downstream entry.
(d) The predicted market structures are averaged, separately for each vertical
segment, over multiple equilibria as well as over draws of the random error
vector.
Figure 6: Simulated Effect of a Ban on Vertically Integrated Entry
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Data Appendix
A.1 Market selection and entry indicators
The US Food and Drug Administration’s website provides a set of datafiles containing informa-
tion on all pharmaceutical finished formulations that have ever been approved, including those
that have been discontinued28. Each approval is identified by a New Drug Application (NDA)
number. From this database, known as the Orange Book, I first extract drugs that contain
a single active pharmaceutical ingredient (API). This is because the relationship between the
upstream API segment and the downstream finished formulation segment is simpler when there
is only one API. Next, I keep drugs for which there is at least one generic approval—called an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) approval—and where the first generic approval
occurs between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 200529.
Since many APIs are approved in multiple dosage forms, the relationship between the
upstream and downstream segments is not always clear-cut even for single-ingredient drugs. For
instance, the hypertension drug diltiazem hydrochloride is approved as a tablet as well as an
injectable, but the API requirements for these two dosage forms are different (one is powder while
the other is liquid); I am not able to discern from the data whether a given API manufacturer
is supplying ingredients for tablets or for injectables.
I resolve this problem by limiting the downstream dataset to the first dosage form for
which a generic is approved and launched, for each API. Moreover, I restrict the sample to
tablets and capsules, including extended-release versions. This is because tablets and capsules
are the two most common dosage forms, and are likely to make up a large proportion of the
derived demand for active pharmaceutical ingredients. These restrictions lead to a downstream
dataset consisting of 91 drugs. Table A.1 presents a list of the drug in the sample.
The upstream dataset for these drugs was constructed from the list of Drug Master Files
(DMFs) published by the FDA on its website30. A DMF is a dossier, submitted by an API
manufacturer to the FDA, containing detailed information regarding the manufacture of a par-
28These files are available from http://www.fda.gov/CDER/orange/obreadme.htm.
29Identifying generic approvals in the Orange Book is no simple matter. One way is to refer to the FDA’s
online database, called Drugs@FDA ( http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm) which
identifies generic approvals with the term “ANDA”. However, I have reason to believe that the FDA’s own
classification is not immune to misclassification; several drugs approved prior to the year 1984 are classified
as ANDA, even though abbreviated applications were not practiced until after the passage of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Therefore, I use the FDA’s classification in conjunction
with another classification method which I term the “trade name rule”. Under this rule, an approved drug is
classified as generic if its trade name is the same as the generic name of the drug. After applying both rules, I
visually inspect all approvals in the database to correct obvious misclassifications.
30The list is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/dmf/.
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ticular product. The FDA refers to the contents of a DMF only when it reviews a New Drug
Application (NDA) for a finished formulation. An NDA—or an ANDA in the case of a generic
product—contains the DMF identification number for the particular brand of API being used,
so that the FDA’s reviewing officer knows where to find the relevant information. Each entry
in the FDA’s list of DMFs contains the names of the API and the manufacturer, as well as the
submission date.
According to industry experts, a DMF submission does not always imply that the sub-
mitting firm is able to supply the active ingredient to the US market (Stafford [2006]). This
is because the FDA neither approves nor rejects a DMF. A manufacturer may file a DMF in
order to advertise that it is willing to supply a particular active pharmaceutical ingredient, but
may not actually produce for the US market until buyer interest is confirmed. On the other
hand, filing a spurious DMF that is not backed by actual production capability is potentially
damaging to a manufacturer’s reputation. Moreover, changing the content of a DMF—say, in
order to scale up to commercial production—is time-consuming, and requires the consent of
customers. I take a DMF submission to indicate upstream entry, but reduce the risk of picking
up spurious DMFs by restricting the dataset to manufacturers with 10 or more submissions,
including submissions for APIs outside the sample.
A.2 Identifying firms and treating mergers
By matching firms in the upstream and downstream datasets, it is possible to identify the
vertical integration status of each entrant in each market. However, the FDA’s data on ANDAs
and DMFs often contain multiple (sometimes erroneous) names for the same firm, and therefore
must be cleaned extensively. Moreover, different firms belonging to the same corporate group
are not identified as such.
To resolve this problem, I refer to the Newport Sourcing TM database, which classifies
finished formulation manufacturers and active ingredient manufacturers into uniquely defined
corporate groups. I use Newport Sourcing’s corporate group classification to identify individual
firms.
Since Newport Sourcing identifies the older ANDAs and DMFs in terms of their current
corporate group affiliations, one must take into account the many mergers and acquisitions—both
horizontal and vertical—that have taken place in the generics industry during the observation
period and beyond. For instance, Teva and IVAX were rivals in both the API and finished
formulation industries until IVAX was acquired by Teva in January 2006. Therefore, the two
firms are treated as being separate before the acquisition. I gathered news information on
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the timings of mergers and acquisitions involving all firms in the sample, and created new
corporate groups to describe the pre-M&A entities. Merger histories are taken into account
when determining the potential entrant status and counting the past entries of individual firms.
54
T
ab
le
A
.1
:
L
is
t
of
dr
ug
s
in
th
e
da
ta
se
t
A
ct
iv
e
p
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
l
D
o
sa
g
e
M
a
rk
et
A
ct
iv
e
p
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
l
D
o
sa
g
e
M
a
rk
et
A
ct
iv
e
p
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
l
D
o
sa
g
e
M
a
rk
et
in
g
re
d
ie
n
t
fo
rm
o
p
en
in
g
in
g
re
d
ie
n
t
fo
rm
o
p
en
in
g
in
g
re
d
ie
n
t
fo
rm
o
p
en
in
g
a
cy
cl
o
v
ir
ca
p
su
le
1
9
9
7
fe
n
o
fi
b
ra
te
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
2
n
a
lt
re
x
o
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
8
a
cy
cl
o
v
ir
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
fe
x
o
fe
n
a
d
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
n
ef
a
zo
d
o
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
a
m
io
d
a
ro
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
8
fl
ec
a
in
id
e
a
ce
ta
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
n
iz
a
ti
d
in
e
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
2
a
n
a
g
re
li
d
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
5
fl
u
co
n
a
zo
le
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
n
o
re
th
in
d
ro
n
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
a
zi
th
ro
m
y
ci
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
fl
u
d
ro
co
rt
is
o
n
e
a
ce
ta
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
n
o
re
th
in
d
ro
n
e
a
ce
ta
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
b
en
a
ze
p
ri
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
fl
u
o
x
et
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
1
o
fl
o
x
a
ci
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
b
et
a
x
o
lo
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
9
fl
u
o
x
et
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
o
m
ep
ra
zo
le
d
el
a
y
ed
-r
el
ea
se
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
2
b
is
o
p
ro
lo
l
fu
m
a
ra
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
fl
u
ta
m
id
e
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
1
o
x
a
p
ro
zi
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
b
ro
m
o
cr
ip
ti
n
e
m
es
y
la
te
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
8
fl
u
v
o
x
a
m
in
e
m
a
le
a
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
p
a
ro
x
et
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
b
u
p
ro
p
io
n
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
9
fo
si
n
o
p
ri
l
so
d
iu
m
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
p
en
to
x
if
y
ll
in
e
ex
te
n
d
ed
-r
el
ea
se
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
b
u
sp
ir
o
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
g
a
b
a
p
en
ti
n
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
4
p
er
g
o
li
d
e
m
es
y
la
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
ca
b
er
g
o
li
n
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
g
a
b
a
p
en
ti
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
p
il
o
ca
rp
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
ca
lc
it
ri
o
l
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
1
g
a
n
ci
cl
o
v
ir
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
3
p
ro
p
a
fe
n
o
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
ce
fp
o
d
o
x
im
e
p
ro
x
et
il
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
g
li
m
ep
ir
id
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
q
u
in
a
p
ri
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
ce
fp
ro
zi
l
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
it
ra
co
n
a
zo
le
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
5
ra
n
it
id
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
ce
fu
ro
x
im
e
a
x
et
il
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
k
et
o
co
n
a
zo
le
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
9
ri
b
a
v
ir
in
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
4
ci
lo
st
a
zo
l
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
k
et
o
ro
la
c
tr
o
m
et
h
a
m
in
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
ri
m
a
n
ta
d
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
ci
p
ro
fl
o
x
a
ci
n
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
la
b
et
a
lo
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
8
so
ta
lo
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
ci
ta
lo
p
ra
m
h
y
d
ro
b
ro
m
id
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
le
fl
u
n
o
m
id
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
ta
m
o
x
if
en
ci
tr
a
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
cl
a
ri
th
ro
m
y
ci
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
le
v
o
rp
h
a
n
o
l
ta
rt
ra
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
te
ra
zo
si
n
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ca
p
su
le
1
9
9
9
cl
o
n
a
ze
p
a
m
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
li
si
n
o
p
ri
l
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
te
ra
zo
si
n
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
9
cl
o
za
p
in
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
lo
v
a
st
a
ti
n
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
te
rb
u
ta
li
n
e
su
lf
a
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
d
ic
lo
fe
n
a
c
p
o
ta
ss
iu
m
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
8
m
efl
o
q
u
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
ti
cl
o
p
id
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
9
d
id
a
n
o
si
n
e
d
el
a
y
ed
-r
el
ea
se
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
4
m
et
fo
rm
in
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
ti
za
n
id
in
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
d
o
x
a
zo
si
n
m
es
y
la
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
m
et
h
im
a
zo
le
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
to
rs
em
id
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
en
a
la
p
ri
l
m
a
le
a
te
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
m
et
o
la
zo
n
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
tr
a
m
a
d
o
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
es
ta
zo
la
m
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
m
id
o
d
ri
n
e
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
u
rs
o
d
io
l
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
0
et
h
a
m
b
u
to
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
0
m
ir
ta
za
p
in
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
zi
d
o
v
u
d
in
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
5
et
o
d
o
la
c
ta
b
le
t
1
9
9
7
m
is
o
p
ro
st
o
l
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
2
zo
n
is
a
m
id
e
ca
p
su
le
2
0
0
5
fa
m
o
ti
d
in
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
m
o
ex
ip
ri
l
h
y
d
ro
ch
lo
ri
d
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
3
fe
lo
d
ip
in
e
ex
te
n
d
ed
-r
el
ea
se
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
4
n
a
b
u
m
et
o
n
e
ta
b
le
t
2
0
0
1
55
